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Belsom: After Coastal Construction: Staking Out a Claim for Private Owner
CASE COMMENTS

AFTER COASTAL CONSTRUCTION: STAKING OUT A
CLAIM FOR PRIVATE OWNERSHIP*
Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v.
Sand Key Assoc. Ltd., 512 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 1987)
Respondent, an owners' association," filed suit to quiet title to five
acres 2 of land that accumulated over a ten-year period on its oceanfront
property. A state erected jetty4 created the land and respondent
neither contributed to nor participated in the project. 5 Respondent
claimed a common-law rule gave riparian owners a right to land caused
by accretion.6 Petitioner 7 challenged respondent's claim and asserted
the state owned the land.8 Petitioner relied on a section of Florida's
Beach and Shore Preservation Act 9 and an early Florida case 10 contending that land created by state activity belongs to the state." Finding

*Editor's Note: This paper received the George W. Milam Outstanding Case Comment Award
for Spring 1988.
1. Sand Key Assocs. Ltd. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund,
458 So. 2d 369, 370 (2d D.C.A. 1984), affd, 512 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 1987). Respondent, Sand Key
Associates, Ltd., owned upland of the disputed property. Id.
2. Sand Key, 458 So. 2d at 370.
3. 512 So. 2d at 935.
4. Sand Key, 458 So. 2d at 370. The jetty was built approximately one-half mile north of
respondent's property. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. 512 So. 2d at 935. Petitioner represented the Internal Improvement Trust Fund of the
State of Florida. Id. See FLA. STAT. §§ 161.141-.211 (1987) (fund established to approve the
use of state lands, locate erosion control lines, approve beach projects, and administer other
matters relating to overflow lands and internal improvement).
8. Sand Key, 458 So. 2d at 370.
9. FLA. STAT. § 161.051 (1987) provides in pertinent part:
Where any person, firm, corporation, county, municipality, township, special district, or any public agency shall construct and install projects when permits have
been properly issued, such works and improvements shall be the property of said
person, firm, corporation, county, municipality, township, special district, or other
public agency .

. .

. No grant under this section shall affect title of the state to

any lands below the mean high-water mark and any additions or accretions to the
upland caused by erection of such works or improvements shall remain the property
of the state if not previously conveyed.
Id.
10. Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274 (1927).
11. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assocs. Ltd.,
512 So. 2d 934, 938-39 (Fla. 1987).
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the statute constitutional,2 the trial court granted the state title to
the accreted land. 13 The Second District Court of Appeal approved
the trial court's ruling on the statute's constitutionality but reversed
the remainder of the order, rewarding the five acres, all future accretions and incidental rights to respondents. 14 Finding no legislative
intent to change the common law, the Second District held that the
statute vests land in the state only when the benefited property owner
creates the accretion.' s The Second District reasoned that a different
result would deprive respondent of its littoral rights without just compensation. 16 On certification 7 the Florida Supreme Court approved the

district court decision and HELD, coastal construction section of the
Beach, Shore and Preservation Act does not divest riparian owners
of their common law rights to accreted lands when the accretions are
state-caused. 18
Early American courts adopted the English rule 19 that lands gradually gained from the sea, a process known as accretion, belong to the
owner of the waterfront property. 20 Since nature could take back what
she gave through erosion, the rule worked natural justice2 and kept
the benefits and risks of waterfront ownership relatively equal.
Courts22 also tended to apply the same principle to land exposed on

12. Sand Key, 458 So. 2d at 371.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 370.
15. Id. at 371.
16. Id. See U.S. CONAT. amends. V & XIV (private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation and no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process). See also J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
318 (1986) [hereinafter J. NOwAK] (due process clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits
state governments from taking property without due process of law).
17. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4) (granting the Florida Supreme Court authority to
review questions of great public importance certified by the district courts).
18. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Associates.
Ltd., 512 So. 2d 934, 938 (Fla. 1987).
19. See F. MALONEY, S. PLAGER, & F. BALDWIN, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION,
THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE §§ 126-126.1, at 385-86 (1968) [hereinafter F. MALONEY] (accretions consist of additions of sand, sediment, or other material to the land above the water line
resulting from the gradual action of the water; the common law rule vests title to accreted soil
in the owners of abutting lands as long as changes are slow and "imperceptible").
20. Banks v. Ogden, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 57, 67 (1864).
21. Id.

22. Mexico Beach Corp. v. St. Joe Paper Co., 97 So. 2d 708, 710 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1957)
(owner of land bounded by a river, lake, or sea is entitled to gradual land additions); Brundage
v. Knox, 279 Ill. 450, 465, 117 N.E. 123, 128-29 (1917) (accretions vest to owners on large,
inland lakes).
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lake shores through natural reliction.z As long as the owner did not
bring the land to his shore, gradual additions would not separate the
owner from his water rights.2 Land below the high water markm and

land beneath the beds of navigable waters 26 remained state property.Y

When man erected dykes, dams and other structures causing accreted or relicted land, courtsP tended to apply the same rule that
title to exposed land vested in the riparian owner,2 if the owner did

not cause the additions himself.3° The United States Supreme Court

recognized this policy in County of Saint Clair v. Lovingstone.3 1 In

St. Clair, the county brought an ejectment action against the defendant for property which formed between his parcel and the Mississippi
River.m The river changed course when the city and the United States
placed rocks on a bank, a project in which the defendant did not
participate.m The Court held that whether man or nature causes the

land additions, the right to future alluvion is a vested right and an
inherent attribute of the original property&i
When the Court decided St. Clair, courts had not yet applied the
fifth amendment's prohibition of taking private property for public use

23. See F. MALONEY, supra note 19, § 126, at 386 (when land formerly covered by water
becomes exposed by the imperceptible rescission of the shore, the process is known as reliction
and title to the exposed land vests in the adjoining owner; but when changes are not gradual
and imperceptible, the process is know as avulsion and the boundary remains unchanged).
24. Brundage, 279 Ill. at 463, 117 N.E. at 128; see also F. MALONEY supra note 19, §
126.2(a), at 389 (if an owner were allowed title to self-caused accretions, an owner could "extend
his land at will, thus talking property which belongs to the state").
25. See F. MALONEY, supra note 19, § 21.6, at 35 (describing high-water mark as legal
boundary between upland and water).
26. See id. § 22.1(a), at 35 (explaining that where waterbody is nonnavigable, the waters
themselves are subject to private ownership, in which case the state and public have no rights
to it).
27. Boyer & Cooper, Real Property, 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 25 (1973).
28. United States v. Claridge, 416 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1969) (resulting accretion passed to
riparian owner and not to state when Hoover Dam affected the course of the Colorado River),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 961 (1970); Solomon v. Sioux City, 243 Iowa 634, 639, 51 N.W.2d 472,
476 (1952) (accretion not caused by landowner belongs to the riparian owner whether artificially
or naturally caused).
29. Lundquist, Artifwial Additions to RiparianLand: Extending the Doctrine of Accretion,
14 Axm. L. REv. 315, 326; see also Boyer & Cooper, supra note 27, at 26.
30. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK, & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 730
(1984).
31. 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46 (1874).
32. Id. at 46.
33. Id. at 50.
34. Id. at 68.
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without compensation to the states.-* However, the Court recognized
waterfront landowners' fundamental rights. The Court reasoned that
a different result would cause too great a hardship on the unconsenting
owner who, having purchased waterfront property, would lose access
because a neighbor's or government project deposited land between
the old and new bank.36
While St. Clair appears to hold that additions caused by third
parties belong to the waterfront landowner, later Supreme Court decisions suggested that each state develop its own substantive law in
this area 7 Florida originally favored state ownership in Martin v.
Busch.38 After government drainage operations lowered the level of
a lake and exposed land between the plaintiffs' property and the
original high water mark, the plaintiffs sued the Trustees of the State
Improvement Fund to remove a cloud on their title.N The Florida
Supreme Court refused to recognize the plaintiffs' right to the property, holding that land reclaimed by state operations vests in the
state.40 The court reasoned that because the reliction was artificially
rather than naturally caused, the original high water mark continued
to be the dividing line between public and private ownership.41 The
concurring opinion in Martin expands this reasoning, suggesting that
artificially-caused changes never cause true accretion or reliction because boundary lines remain unchanged and vested property rights
are not affected.A
In Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v.
MedeiraBeach Nominee4 the Florida Second District Court of Appeal

35.

See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 505 (9th ed.

1975) (explaining that the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), implicity rejected
the idea that the fourteenth amendment applied the Bill of Rights' guarantees to the states).
36. 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) at 61.
37. See Oregon State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977) (disputed
ownership of riverbed lands was governed solely by state law). See also Hughes v. State, 389
U.S. 290, 295 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894) (each state
must deal with the land within its own borders according to its own views or justice and policy).
38. 93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274 (1927).
39. Id. at 565, 112 So. at 284.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 574, 112 So. at 287; accord, Padgett v. Central & S. Fla. Flood Control Dist.,
178 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1965) (reclaimed land created when the state constructed a levy
altered the character of defendant's property so that it no longer bordeered the waterfront).
42. 93 Fla. at 578, 112 So. at 288.
43. 272 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1973).
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questioned whether courts could constitutionally" deprive upland owners of their waterfront status, the apparent result of Martin.45 In
Medeira, additional property accumulated in front of appellee's Sand
46
Key property because of a city-sponsored erosion control program.
When appellee began improving the accreted land, appellant 47 sued to
enjoin the activity." The District Court affirmed a lower court's sum9
mary judgment in favor of appellee.4

Distinguishing Martin as a lakefront reliction rather than oceanfront accretion case, 5° the Medeira court held that the state had no

interest in property which accumulated on appellee's oceanfront due
to the city-sponsored project. 51 Although a lawful exercise of government police powers caused the accretions, the court found the state's
interest in the land far less than that of the riparian landowner who
had an interest in maintaining the property's waterfront character. 2

44. See J. NOWAK, supra note 16, at 402 (under modern interpretations of fifth and fourteenth amendments, damage caused to property as an incidental result of government activity
may be a 'taing" for which compensation must be paid, although no general rule exists to
describe what constitutes a compensable taking).
45. 272 So. 2d at 212.
46. Id. at 211. Since Medeira, the legislature revised portions of the Beach, Shore, and
Preservation Act to give the state title to accreted lands forming on the seaward side of control
lines used in erosion control projects. See FLA. STAT. § 161.141 (1987) which provides in
pertinent part:
Any additions to the upland property landward of the established line of mean
high water which result from the restoration project shall become the property of
the upland owner .... Such resulting additions to upland property shall also be
subject to a public easement for traditional uses of the sandy beach consistent with
uses which would have been allowed prior to the need for such restoration project.
It is further declared that there is no intention on the part of the state to extend
its claims to lands not already held by it or to deprive any upland or submerged
land owner of the legitimate and constitutional use and enjoyment of his property.
Id. At the time of Medeira, § 161.141 did not contain this language. See FLA. STAT. § 161.141
(1973).
47. See supra text accompanying note 7.
48. 272 So. 2d at 211.
49. Id. at 215.
50. Id. at 212. The court stated that it would not apply Martin to Medeira because the
former dealt with an intentional project to change the water level of the lake while the Medeira
Beach project was not intended to produce the resulting accretion. Id. The court added that
even if this similarity were shown, the court would not apply this holding in a reliction case to
an accretion case. Id.
51. Id. at 211.
52. Id. at 214. Riparian owners have interests in maintaining several rights, including the
rights to access to the water, an unobstructed view, a qualified common law right to wharf out
to navigable waters, and reasonable use and consumption of water. Id.
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The court reasoned that owners sustaining the burden of losses and
repairs through erosion should receive the benefits of accretion and
continued right of access to the water.0
The court decided Medeiraafter the enactment of Florida Statutes
§ 161.051 which appears to grant title for property additions caused
by coastal construction to the state 4 The court did not apply the
statute because the erosion control projects began before its enactment.55 The court interpreted the section as "purport(ing) to vest title
to accretions caused by public works in the state." The court
suggested that even if it applied the statute retroactively as the state
urged, its impact on riparian rights would raise constitutional problems. 57 Thus, an important fifth amendment question survived
Medeira: how extensive would state rights be under the statute in
light of owners' interests in water access and the constitutional prohibition on taking without just compensation?5
Although the instant case provided the Florida Supreme Court
with an opportunity to resolve this broad issue, the question the lower
court certified 59 was narrowly framed around the statute's language.6

53. Id. at 212-13.
54. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
55. 272 So. 2d at 214.
56. Id. See Boyer & Cooper, supra note 27, at 26 (statute's "use would appear open to
constitutional challenge").
57. 272 So. 2d at 214. The court did not address a related statute which provides in pertinent
part:
Riparian rights are those incident to land bordering upon navigable waters. They
are rights of ingress, egress, boating, bathing and fishing and such others as may
be or have been defined by law. Such rights are not of a proprietary nature. They
are rights inuring to the owner of the riparian land but are not owned by him.
FLA. STAT. § 253.141 (1987) (formerly §§ 192.61(1) (4), 271.09, 197.315(3), 197.228).
58. See Hughes v. State, 389 U.S. 290, 295 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring) (Justice Stewart
cautioned against takings without compensation in violation of the Constution); see also Boyer
& Cooper, supra note 27, at 26 (By passage of the statute, the state cannot be permitted to
defeat the constitutional prohibition against taking of property without due process of law and
just compensation.").
59. Florida's Second District Court of Appeal certified the following question
PURSUANT TO SECTION 161.051, FLORIDA STATUTES (1981), IS THE
STATE ENTITLED TO ACCRETED LAND OF ONLY THE UPLAND OWNER
OF THE IMPROVED PROPERTY OR TO THE ACCRETED LAND OF ALL
UPLAND AND LITTORAL OWNERS, WHETHER OR NOT THEY PARTICIPATED IN OR CONTRIBUTED TO THE IMPROVEMENT?
Sand Key Assoc. Ltd. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 458 So.
2d 369, 371 (2d D.C.A. 1984), affd, 512 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 1987).
60.

See supra note 9.
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The majority envisioned two statutory interpretations and settled on
the view favoring landowners and the common law.61 Under the instant
court's approach, the state could obtain title to the upland owner's
accretions only if the owner contributed to the improvements.62 The
instant court specifically rejected a broader interpretation giving the
state title to all artificially-caused additions.63 The majority explained
that the section was intended to codify the common law and not to
deprive unsuspecting waterfront owners of rights to land caused by
others' activities.6 The instant court also approved the lower court's
ruling on the statute's constitutionality.6 Like the district court in
Medeira, the instant court feared that vesting such property in the
state required just compensation.6 6
While the instant court addressed Martin, it narrowly read the
case finding no precedent for a state claim to title.67 Focusing on

Martin's concurring opinion, the instant court agreed that the issue
in Martin was not one of true reliction.6 The instant majority apparently reasoned that when the state lowers water levels for a public
purpose, no true reliction occurs because the change is not imperceptible. 69 The state still owns land up to the original high-water mark
and abutting property still retains its waterfront characteristics.70
Finding Martin unhelpful and insufficient authority for changing the
common law in cases of true accretion and reliction,71 the majority
refused to deprive respondent of rights so well-grounded in history
and precedent.T2
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Ehrlich accused the majority of misconstruing the statute's plain language,3 grossly misinterpreting Mar-

61.

512 So. 2d at 939. The Court was construing FLA. STAT. § 161.051 (1981).

62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

66.

Id. Like the Medeira court, the instant court did not address § 253.141 which suggests

that riparian rights are not proprietary in nature. Id. See supra note 57.
67.

512 So. 2d at 941.

68. Id.
69. Id. See also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
70.

512 So. 2d at 941.

71. Id. The court reasoned that decisions subsequent to Martin showed no intent to change
common law principles on owners' rights to accretions and relictions. Id. at 939.
72.
73.

Id. at 936.
Id. at 947 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
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tin,74 and circumventing a clear policy to preserve state beaches. 75
Ehrlich reasoned that the statute and Martin were directed toward
the same, worthwhile goal of protecting previously submerged lands
from private development. 76 In Ehrlich's view, the majority subverted
this aim through misinterpretation.7 The dissenting justice first stated
that the majority's reliance on St. Clairwas misplaced since that case
concerned Illinois substantive property law and had no precedential
value for Florida. 7 Further, while Martin had strong precedential
value, the court crippled its holding by distinguishing between true
reliction which assures common law rights and other types of shoreline
exposure which apparently do not. 79 In Ehrlich's view, Martin simply
held that title to exposed land remains with the state when the state
causes the exposure3 Finally, the dissent stated that owners' fears
of private land losing its waterfront characteristics under a broader
statutory interpretation were exaggerated. 81 In Martin, the owners
"lost" nothing since their property line remained at the ordinary highwater mark as it previously existed. 2
Florida has authority to set its own substantive law regarding title
to exposed sovereign lands provided it refrains from constitutional
prohibitions on uncompensated takings.A3 As the differing opinions in
Medeira and Martin point out, however, the state's rightful assertion
of ownership depends on whether the state or the abutting owner lays
the better claim to "vested rights." The majority follows the traditional
view expressed in St. Clair and Medeira that rights to accretion or
reliction automatically vest in the landowner even if caused by the
state.8 Under this view, the landowner is granted property rights
which under the fifth amendment cannot be taken without just compen-

74.

Id. (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).

75. Id. (Ehrlich, J., dissenting) (Ehrlich saw this policy in the title of the legislation: 'The
Beach and Shore Preservation Act."). See FLA. STAT. § 161.051 (1981).
76. 512 So. 2d at 947 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 945 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 941 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 945 (Ehrlich, J. dissenting). Ehrlich added, "It would fly in the face of known
physical laws and plain common sense to presume that a deliberate drainage operation in an
enormous fresh water lake such as Lake Okeechobee was anything other than slow and imperceptible." Id.

80. Id. at 945.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
512 So. 2d at 936.
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sation. 15 The dissent, however, adopted an equally sound approach to
this issue. Given the state's undisputed title in the beds of navigable
waters,r worthwhile public projects should not divest the state of
property held in trust for all the people.s The "loss" of property in
Martin is not an actual deprivation if one considers that the property
line remained unchanged and that the state gained no more than it originally owned.a3 The dissent's rationale apparently depends on the
state's use of the newly-exposed property.89 If, for example, the state
blocked the owner's access 9° or obstructed the water view9' the land-

owner would seem to have greater cause to complain of an unconstitu92
tional taking.
The instant case is valuable for what it did not decide. First, the
court decided not to alter the common law or landowners' expectations.93 Instead, the traditional rule that vests title to accreted lands
in upland owners who do not bring the land to their property remains
intact even with the enactment of section 161.051., This result is contrary to Medeira's prediction that the statute wrests title from the
landowner.9 5 Second, the court did not distinguish between lakefront

85. See supra note 58.
86. Brickell v. Trammel, 77 Fla. 544, 558-59, 82 So. 221, 226 (1919).
87. 512 So. 2d at 949 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 945 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
89. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987) (for land use to be a
regulation rather than a taking for which compensation is necessary, state must show a close
relation between the regulation selected and the government objective); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 107 S.Ct. 2378 (1987) (regulations denying owner
all economically viable use of land is a compensable taking rather than an uncompensable regulation); cf. Maloney & O'Donnell, Drawing the Line at the Oceanfront: The Role of Coastal
Construction Setback Lines in Regulating Development of the Coastal Zone, 30 U. FLA. L.
REV. 383, 400 (1978) (Florida courts tend to view coastal regulations as non compensatory
takings when owner retains beneficial use of property).
90. See Ferry Pass Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n v. White's River Inspectors' & Shippers'
Ass'n, 57 Fla. 399, 402, 48 So. 643, 645 (1909) (riparian owners have a right of access to the water).
91. Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A. Ry., 75 Fla. 28, 58, 78 So. 491, 501 (1918) (riparian landowner
enjoys a common law right of an unobstructed view over the water).
92. See supra note 89.
93. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Medeira Beach Nominee,
272 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1973).
94. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assocs. Ltd.,
512 So. 2d 934, 939 (Fla. 1987). Accretions caused by beach renourishment apparently constitute
an exception. See supra note 46.
95. Medeira, 272 So. 2d at 214. See also Boyer & Cooper, sufra note 27, at 26 (the statute
"purports to vest title to accretions caused by public works in the state").
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and oceanfront additions, and moved toward a more uniform recognition of riparian rights. Florida courts, perhaps unintentionally, pursued
different policies depending on whether the property abutted an
ocean9 or a lake. 97 Aside from the instant majority's confused attempt
to distinguish Martin as a less-than-true reliction case, the instant
case appears to grant equal rights to oceanfront and lakefront owners. 98
Whether the addition is naturally or artificially caused by accretion
or reliction, 99 title vests in the abutting landowner. 1°0
Finally, the court refused to allow new policy considerations outweigh old common law values, a point which the dissent strongly
criticized. 1 1 In the dissent's view, the majority's narrow statutory
reading turned preservation legislation into a gift-giving mechanism
favoring private landowners. 1°2 In the majority's view, the narrow
reading prevented unbridled state access. 103 Given the number of public
works projects along state shorelines, the majority feared automatic
deprivation of owners' valuable waterfront ownership.'- Neither side,
however, explored a third alternative which appears more palatable
to both state and private interests. This alternative grants title to the
state only when improvements causing the accretions "regulate and
improve navigation"'

°5

or "have an essential relation to the public

°6

enjoyment."
Such an approach prevents unbridled usurpation of
riparian rights while giving the state leeway to act in the public interest.1107

96. Id. at 212. See also Sidener v. City of Pensacola, 13 Fla. Supp. 120, 128 (Escambia
County Cir. Ct. 1958) (oceanfront owner is entitled to artificial accretions).
97. See Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 575-76, 112 So. 274, 287 (1927) (riparian owner did

not gain rights to land exposed on the shores of Lake Okeechobee); R.E. Padgett v. Central
& S. Fla. Flood Control Dist., 178 So. 2d 900, 905 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1965) (lakefront owners'
riparian rights were subject to the state interests when government projects reclaimed previously
covered shorelands).

98. 512 So. 2d at 936. In its concluding paragraphs, the majority did not distinguish between
lakefront and oceanfront rights. Id. at 941.
99.

See supra note 23.

100.

512 So. 2d at 938.

101.

Id. at 947 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).

102. Id.
103.

Id. at 939.

104. Id.
105. See Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 342 Mass. 251, 257, 173 N.E.2d
273, 277 (1961) (because state's creation of a beach was unnecessary for navigation, title to the
beach vested in the upland owner rather than the state).
106. Id. at 258, 173 N.E.2d at 278.

107.

Florida apparently has taken this legislative approach on erosion control. See supra

note 46.
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The majority opinion is far from unassailable. The opinion sets
forth a federal, common law right to artificial accretions'08 without
noting the independent rights of states to develop their own laws in
this area. 1'1 Moreover, as Ehrlich suggested, the majority's analysis of
Martin and its attempt to justify state ownership by distinguishing
between "imperceptible" artificial reliction, and "perceptible" artificial
exposure of a shoreline, 110 complicates understanding owners' riparian
rights.1
The case's value lies in the court's assurances to waterfront owners,
by no means a small group in Florida, that their waterfront property
will remain on the waterfront despite additions caused by government
projects not relating to erosion control."1 In the instant case, had the
state acquired title to the five acres and used it for a public purpose,
the character of respondent's property would have been significantly
altered. Conversely, the potential boon to property owners resulting
from this decision is enormous.13 In the instant case, respondent was
awarded five acres of accreted property on valuable land on the Gulf
of Mexico.14
When the public discovers that costly government improvements
actually grant away state property, the court may reconsider its holding.', However, a policy vesting accreted land in the state each time
the government builds a dyke or dam seems unjust to property owners
who have paid valuable consideration for their waterfront status." 6 A
more reasonable approach vests title in the state only when an essential
public purpose causes the artificial addition. This policy is followed in
at least one other jurisdiction, 117 and apparently in Florida's revised
legislation on erosion control." 8 Even in these circumstances, however,
the state "should have only limited use of the exposed property to
preserve the waterfront character of the owner's land.
Elizabeth Belsom
108. 512 So. 2d at 938.
109. See supra note 37.
110. 512 So. 2d at 945 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
111. See supra note 79.
112. 512 So. 2d at 939. The court did not mention accretions caused by erosion control,
which may be an exception. See supra note 46.
113. Id. at 935. The majority noted, "The issue in this cause is narrow, but has broad
ramifications for Florida's waterfront owners." Id.
114. See supra note 1.
115. 512 So. 2d at 947 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 939.
117. See supra note 105.
118. See supra note 46.
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